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INTRODUCTION
Nancy A. Welsh

I am delighted to write the introduction to Volume 5 of the Yearbook on
Arbitration and Mediation. I begin by expressing my deep gratitude to all of the students
who are members of the Yearbook’s Editorial Board and staff, with special thanks to
Editor-in-Chief Zach Morahan for all of his efforts. The Yearbook has made great strides
in every year of its existence. This year is no exception. Indeed, its progress is especially
notable on several fronts.
And now it is my pleasure to turn to the Yearbook’s 2013 symposium: The Role of
the Courts: Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards and Mediated Settlement Agreements. It
is an honor to introduce the articles written for this symposium, which was designed to
capture, and contribute to, three different dialogues: 1) the dialogue that is taking place
between our public courts and private arbitration, regarding the place of arbitration; 2) the
similar dialogue that is occurring between our public courts and mediation; and 3) the
dialogue that sometimes occurs between those who identify more with arbitration and
those who tend to favor mediation.
The first dialogue—which has had its ups and downs—is most obvious. As
anyone interested in arbitration in the U.S. must know by now, our courts initially were
hostile to arbitration. The merchants who had inserted these clauses in their contracts,
though, asserted their right to self-determination. They had selected this dispute
resolution procedure in order to vest procedural and decision-making power in arbitrators
who would understand and enforce the merchants’ procedural and substantive norms.
Congress responded with the Federal Arbitration Act, compelling courts to enforce
arbitration agreements as they would any other contracts.
From the perspective of someone like myself, who has focused primarily on
mediation, a period of relative calm ensued. Arbitration appeared to operate quite selfsufficiently within its own self-contained sphere of influence in the commercial sector.1
But even for me, it was clear that the situation changed dramatically in 1991. That year,
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,2 the Supreme Court opened the door to the
use of arbitration to decide all sorts of statutory, civil rights claims arising out of
contracts of adhesion. While merchants and commercial arbitrators had hailed arbitration
as an expression of self-determination, the Supreme Court had apparently spied a tool for
the provision of streamlined, inexpensive, individualized adjudication that could relieve
courts’ burgeoning dockets.
The enforcement of arbitration clauses has been the focus of an extraordinary
number of recent Supreme Court decisions. The ultimate power of arbitration, however,
lies in its ability to produce outcomes that actually will be implemented. When
arbitration was truly private, and was the result of arms-length negotiation among
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merchants, arbitration proponents could count on the process being perceived as fair and
worthy of voluntary compliance. That is much less true today. When arbitration is the
“creature” of a contract of adhesion, and when courts have forced arbitration on unwilling
parties, the stage is set for skepticism about arbitration’s fairness and compliance with
arbitral awards cannot be assumed. Winning parties are more likely to turn to the courts
for help once again, this time with the enforcement of the award produced by courtordered arbitration. Should courts always enforce these awards? Does every arbitral
award deserve enforcement?
At this point in the evolution of mandatory predispute arbitration, judicial review
is the slender reed that remains to ensure that the procedure is sufficiently accountable to
merit access to the enforcement power of the state. Consistent with this new reality,
Professor Jeffrey Stempel urges that the Supreme Court’s expansive enforcement of
arbitration agreements must be matched by an equally-expansive jurisprudence regarding
the grounds for judicial review. He urges, in particular, that if arbitral awards reflect
clear errors of factual determination or application of law, they should be interpreted as
imperfect executions of arbitrators’ power and should be vacated for failing to meet the
requirement of “a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted.”3
In a similar vein, Professor Maureen Weston highlights the far-reaching (but largely
under-appreciated) decision of Preston v. Ferrer,4 in which the Supreme Court
announced that “[w]hen parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract,
the FAA supersedes state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether
judicial or administrative.”5 Professor Weston fears Preston’s preemptive effect.
Specifically, she anticipates that arbitration will be used to undermine state agencies’
ability to protect citizens and implement public policy, subject to state-defined grounds
for judicial review. She calls for Congress to rein in the “monster” that the FAA has
become, and ensure that private arbitration is required to operate within the bounds of
state and federal law, not as a means around those laws.6 Sounding substantially more
optimistic, Professor Allen Blair suggests that even though the Supreme Court made clear
in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.7 that contracting parties may not dictate
additional grounds for judicial review to federal courts, state courts may want to seize the
opportunity to innovate and respond to parties’ preferences in this area.8
The second dialogue, between public courts and mediation, obviously is different
in some ways. It is much less likely that courts will be asked to enforce a mediation
clause contained in a contract, although that is changing as companies adopt “tiered”
dispute resolution clauses. Rather, much mediation occurs within the courts as part of
court-connected mediation programs. Courts often order or strongly encourage parties to
use mediation. They can do this because mediation is a consensual process, and courts
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are not depriving parties of their day in court. They are merely conditioning access upon
an attempt to reach settlement through mediation.
As soon as we scratch the surface, though, we find dynamics in this dialogue that
are much like those that exist in the dialogue between the courts and arbitration.
Mediation, like arbitration, is grounded in self-determination. Proponents laud its ability
to: enhance the content and civility of parties’ communication and negotiation; permit the
parties’ uncovering of the underlying interests and norms that are important to them; and
produce customized, creative solutions. As Professor Jennifer Reynolds observes, some
judges value these aspects of mediation, especially if the judges serve as mediators
themselves or care about the “fit” between the social role of our courts and mediation.9
But according to Professor Reynolds, when judges focus on their obligation to process
cases, they are much more likely to see mediation’s potential to clear court dockets,
reduce expenses for the parties and courts, and whittle away at case disposition times. In
other words, when the institutional needs of the courts dominate, the efficiency of
settlement becomes much more salient than parties’ self-determination.
Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley expresses concerns about court-connected
mediation’s focus on settlement. In particular, she points to evidence that parties
increasingly are objecting to the enforcement of mediated settlement agreements, arguing
that there was never a meeting of the minds or that the agreements were the product of
manipulation or even outright coercion. Professor Nolan-Haley, therefore, proposes an
end to court-ordered mediation. She suggests using incentives instead. Specifically, U.S.
courts could borrow a page from the U.K. and authorize judges to approve fee-shifting if
a party’s refusal to mediate was not reasonable.10 Last, Professor James Coben examines
the role of mediators in helping class counsel and class representatives settle class
actions. Importantly, Professor Coben reveals the very substantial deference that judges
grant to these mediators as the judges determine whether or not to approve class
settlements. Professor Coben expresses great skepticism about the wisdom of judges’
reliance on mediators’ presence as a sort of heuristic for procedural and substantive
fairness. He therefore proposes that mediators should be replaced with special masters
who should be required to file reports explaining why settlements are non-collusive and
sufficiently fair to absent class members.11
The final dialogue, between mediation sympathizers and arbitration proponents,
might not be obvious to anyone outside the dispute resolution family.12 As should
already be clear, arbitration and mediation share a common grounding in self9
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determination. But they are also quite different. In this, they resemble siblings in many
families. Mediation looks like a meeting (or series of ex parte meetings); it is described
as “consensual;” and it produces settlement agreements, a type of contract. Arbitration is
the “the creature of contract,” but it generally looks like a hearing (that includes all of the
parties); it is described as “adjudicative;” and it produces an award.
What happens when mediation and arbitration, like some siblings, are forced to
work together? It’s complicated. Imagine that the parties use one neutral, who serves
first as a mediator. In that role, he meets privately with each side and learns confidential
information. The matter fails to settle. The mediator then becomes an arbitrator. He
now knows “secret information” which may or may not be disclosed during the
arbitration proceeding. This “secret information” may find its way into his award.
Professor Ellen Deason grapples with these issues and focuses particularly on the
appropriate standard of judicial review for the award produced by med-arb. Very
interestingly, she begins by concluding that the FAA would not apply, because the medarb process differs so materially from arbitration. She then emphasizes the need for
courts to engage in rigorous examination of a party’s consent to waive the fundamental
due process rights of equal treatment and an opportunity to be heard. Finally, Professor
Deason explains what courts should demand before they deem such consent to be
sufficiently knowing and voluntary.13 Professor Andrea Schneider tackles a different
relationship between consensual and adjudicative processes, in the investment treaty
arbitration context. She examines what sort of consensual process is needed to address
the role of, and norms guiding, the annulment committees that review arbitral panels’
awards. On this increasingly important and contentious topic, she urges the inclusion of
all stakeholders in a transparent and procedurally just process to clarify what “error
correction” should mean and how it can best be accomplished (which may include
considering the merits of an appeal process compared to annulment, as well a quasipolitical process compared to a quasi-judicial process).14
All of these articles reflect the authors’ great respect (and even affection) for
arbitration, mediation and the new hybrids that are developing. All of them also reflect
these authors’ recognition of the need for hard-headed examination and skepticism
regarding the claims made by any process, as well as need to consider context.
Inevitably, all of these articles affirm the key role played by courts in their exercise of
judicial review. Today, judicial review represents the most important procedural
counterweight to assure arbitration’s accountability.
There is great dynamism in the world (or worlds) of arbitration and mediation
today. So many relationships, so much reason for dialogue. We hope that you enjoy
(and use) this volume of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation.
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